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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between sentiment-apt investors and UK
stock returns at industry level over the period January 1988 to December 2017.
Using two new sentiment proxies (laggards to leaders and growth opportunity
index) for 10 discrete sector groupings, we provide novel evidence on how returns
in the UK stock market react to the activities of sentiment-disposed investors.
First, using threshold nonlinear regression, we document a significant relationship
between the laggards to leaders sentiment proxy and sectoral returns. Our findings
reveal that aggregate returns in the sector are affected by activities of investors
who embark on profit-taking when there is an increase in the proportion of lag-
ging to leading stocks beyond the threshold value. Secondly, when using the
growth opportunity sentiment proxy, we report that the increase in growth above
the growth threshold value has a significant impact on sector returns. This study
further confirms significant impact of non-threshold variables on sector groupings.
Our findings are robust, having been subjected to a range of robustness checks.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
For several decades, the efficient market hypothesis
(EMH) stood as the dominant theoretical framework for
capital market analysis. Across financial markets in the
world, the development of financial policies, strategies
and price modelling was centred on the assumptions of
market efficiency. In recent times however, this notion
has faced several theoretical and empirical criticisms,
arising from observed flaws in its adaptation (Barber
and Odean, 2007; Kim and Kim, 2014; Chen and
Sherif, 2016; Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2018).1 Conse-
quently, the emergence and development of behavioural
finance has become a centre of discourse in the financial
literature.
Behavioural finance posits that stock price movements
reflect psychological processes of market participants and
the information structure around financial markets, which
systematically influence investors' attitude and perception
towards the market (Shefrin and Statman, 2000). Never-
theless, stock markets around the world are designed in
such a way as to attain efficiency, whether at the weak,
semi-strong or strong form (Malkiel and Fama, 1970; She-
rif and Chen, 2019), so that no individual or institutional
investor can consistently outperform the average expected
performance of the market due to past, private or publicly
available information. However, a large body of empirical
evidence has shown that sentiments significantly account
for the frequent movements in stock prices, as investors
are described as being generally discerning about financial
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investments (Fisher and Statman, 2003; Baker and
Wurgler, 2006; Schmeling, 2009; Arin et al., 2013; Yang
et al., 2017; Uhl, 2014).
Compared to the incongruous proxies adopted by pre-
vious works, our study, in two different ways, provides
new evidence on how activities of sentiment-induced
investors shape aggregate stock returns at the industry
level. First, using UK sector-based data between January
1988 and December 2017, we examine both the ratio of
lagging to leading stocks, and also the growth opportunity
index, as proxies for sentiments. Secondly, we analyse the
impact of both variables on sectoral returns using both lin-
ear and non-linear approaches. Our choice of the UK mar-
ket is due to its strategic importance in the world financial
markets generally, and in that of Europe, in particular.
With a market capitalization of almost five trillion dollars
as at April 2018 (LSE quarterly report, 2018), the UK mar-
ket is, the largest market in Europe, and is undoubtedly
an attractive investment platform for prospective investors
who crave for optimum returns and diversification. Given
its global pertinence, market depth and perhaps efficiency,
we strongly advocate that sentiments should not drive sec-
toral returns in the UK stock market. Moreover, the wave
of uncertainties regarding the future of the UK economy
due to its proposed exit from the European Union (Brexit)
is another motivation for this study.
Again, our choice of sentiment variables stems from the
assumption that sentiment-prone investors are mostly risk-
averse investors who are generally more concerned about
loss minimization than return maximization (Shefrin and
Statman, 2000). Hence, we hypothesize that for any given
sector or industry, when the ratio of underperforming to
over-performing stocks is consistently increasing (i.e., ratio
of laggards to leaders), sentiment-apt investors would grad-
ually avoid such sectors, and consequently, overall return
index of the sector would be negatively affected. In addition,
we hypothesize that although investors have disparate atti-
tudes towards each sector of the stock market, rational
investors are nevertheless allured and thus converge
towards sector(s) with growth potential. By implication,
such sectors exert influence on market sentiments and in
turn, create a significant impact on the overall sectoral
return index. A graphical representation of variables used
for this study is shown in Figures 1 and 2.2
Over the years, the behavioural strand of finance has
been advanced by several studies on sentiments and returns,
with an array of proxies for sentiment and a major emphasis
on aggregate market returns. However, the inconsistent and
varied positions of prior studies have exacerbated the debate
on market sentiments in the financial literature. For
instance, proponents of media-based sentiment provide logi-
cal arguments to support the belief that threads on social
media stimulate the attitude of investors towards the market
which consequently affect stock price movement (Bollen
et al., 2011; Rao and Srivastava, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2013;
Mostafa, 2013; Nofer and Hinz, 2015; Leitch and
Sherif, 2017). These studies conjecture that market senti-
ment is attributed to the sensitivity of investors who rely on
information sourced from popular print and online media
outlets (such as Yahoo-Finance, Google, Twitter, Wall Street
Journal, New York Times and Financial Times). Hence,
they conclude that the propensity of such information chan-
nels to induce price fluctuation is significant. However, the
findings of these studies have been discredited based on the
notoriety of media fake news and the reality that the influ-
ence of information contained in media outlets largely
depends on the number of positive or negative words, the
popularity of the media outlets and the commenter.
Furthermore, another group of sentiment studies sup-
port the use of consumer surveys as proxies for sentiments
(David and Sultan, 1998; Jansen and Nahuis, 2003; Arabian
and Zomorrodian, 2007; Chen, 2011; Salhin et al., 2016;
Brown and Cliff, 2005; Yang et al., 2017). These studies
opine that consumer surveys significantly highlight respon-
dents' financial and socio-economic status and, in addition,
evaluate investors' optimism on future expectations of the
economy. However, information obtained from surveys
cannot be sufficiently trusted, considering that scant, dis-
honest and misleading information may be provided by
respondents, which consequently inhibits the predictive
power of surveys (Singer, 2002; Schmeling, 2009).
In the spirit of the above sentiment conundrum and in
light of the increasing scepticism due to indecisions
regarding Brexit plans, our study bridges the gap in the lit-
erature by providing clarity, new factual findings and pre-
cautionary information for market regulators, investment
professionals, academics, policy makers and also in rela-
tion to the general investment environment regarding the
vulnerability of UK sectoral returns to the activities of
sentiment-induced investors.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 provides a literature review of studies that have
considered the Fundamental (Economic) Determinants of
Stock Market Returns and Sentiment-based Determinants of
Stock Market Returns, in order to support the formulation of
our hypotheses. Section 3 provides details of the data and
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical findings, and
Section 5 concludes the paper, stating the significance of the
main findings and outlining avenues for future research.
2 | CONTEXTUALIZATION OF
THE STUDY
Although the basic consensus in the literature suggests
that markets behave randomly, it is, nonetheless,
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imperative to highlight that a multitude of approaches
have been suggested by previous studies to account for
the sharp or gradual change in prices of stocks across
sectors or markets. The behaviour of each market is
akin to response to stimuli; that is, its perception and
reaction to activities of both internal and external
environments. Analysing market behaviour involves
identifying factors affecting risk and returns in the
market. In the literature, such factors are grouped into
two categories: fundamental and sentiment factors.
Empirical studies into these factors are discussed in
the next subsection.
2.1 | Fundamental (economic)
determinants of stock market returns
As an extension to the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) earlier introduced by Sharpe (1964), Ross's (1976)
theory of arbitrage pricing (APT), laid, arguably, the most
prominent foundation for most studies investigating the
influence of economic variables on market behaviour.
CAPM recognizes the role of an asset's systematic risk
(as represented by beta) in predicting its expected return.
In contrast, APT advocates that the behaviour of an asset
is a linear function of macroeconomic factors whose
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FIGURE 1 Sector groupings returns [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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number and nature change periodically and between
economies. Providing empirical explanations to the
nature of macroeconomic factors that affect markets,
Chen et al. (1986) identify surprises in inflation and gross
national product as key variables.
The APT's ability to predict stock return provides
strong footing for many of the earliest empirical works
on stock market behaviour; consequently, subsequent
studies have adopted factor analysis in identifying signifi-
cant economic variables, whether for a country study or a
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FIGURE 2 Sentiment indicators and sector groupings returns [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
4 SAKARIYAHU ET AL.
cross-country endeavour. For example, Kearney and
Daly (1998) investigate the causes of stock price fluctua-
tions in Australian stock market. Employing Generalized
Least Squares (GLS) estimation strategy to analyse
monthly data, the study observes that macroeconomic
variables such as inflation and interest rates are direct
determinants of volatility in Australian stock market
while industrial production, money supply and current
account deficit have indirect impact on stock market vol-
atility. Among the variables adopted in the study, money
supply is observed to have the strongest effect on stock
price movements in Australia. In another study, Flannery
and Protopapadakis (2002), using the Generalized Auto-
regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH)
model and U.S. daily equity returns, find that consumer
price index, monetary aggregate, purchasing power
index, balance of trade, employment report and housing
statistics have a significant impact on aggregate stock
returns in the U.S. In a related study in New Zealand,
although with a different methodology, Lee and
Gan (2006) examine the effect of macroeconomic vari-
ables (such as consumer price index [CPI], long term
interest rate, short term interest rate, real GDP, exchange
rate, money supply and domestic retail oil prices) on the
NZSE Index between January 1990 to January 2003. With
the aid of Johansen multivariate co-integration tests and
Granger causality tests, Lee and Gan (2006) find that all
macroeconomic variables adopted (except exchange rate
and inflation rate index) have a significant impact on
NZSE Index.
In another study providing evidence for cross-country
analysis, Garcia and Liu (1999) investigated the macro-
economic determinants of stock market development
using pooled data from 15 industrial3 and developing
countries from 1980 to 1995. Their study shows that sav-
ings rate, real income and liquidity are important deter-
minants of stock market development in those countries.
Similarly, Errunza and Hogan (1998) investigated the
impact of macroeconomic data on European stock mar-
ket volatility. Their study showed that past variability of
monetary or real macroeconomic factors have significant
impact on stock market volatility within Europe. In other
work, using markets in Latin America, Errunza and
Hogan (1998) examined the relationship between macro-
economic volatility and stock returns, and found that
macroeconomic indicators such as interest rates, indus-
trial production, money supply, MSCI world index,
U.S. 3-month T-bill yield and exchange rates are consis-
tently significant in explaining returns across all markets,
although at varying significance and magnitudes. Fur-
ther, using co-integration analysis, Humpe and Macmil-
lan (2009) document influence of macroeconomic
variables on stock prices in U.S. and Japan. They report
that in the U.S., stock prices are influenced positively by
industrial production and money supply but have nega-
tive relationship with CPI and long term interest rate.
For the Japanese market on the other hand, their study
finds that stock prices are negatively influenced by
money supply but positively by industrial production.
Evidence of macroeconomic variables influencing
stock price behaviour has also been documented in the
emerging markets. For instance, in the case of European
emerging markets, using data from 1990 to 1999, Patra
and Poshakwale (2006) explore the effect of fundamental
variables on stock returns in Greece. Adopting a Granger
causality, co-integration test and error correction model,
their study demonstrates that inflation, money supply
and trading volume have both short and long run rela-
tionships with prices of stocks in Greece, although the
exchange rate has no co-integrating relationship with
stock prices. Similarly, providing evidence of fundamen-
tal factors in Turkey stock market returns, Kasman
et al. (2011) investigate the effects of changes in interest
rates and foreign exchange rates on banks' stock returns
and, found that both interest and exchange rates are
major determinants of banks conditional returns, owing
to their significant negative impacts.
Shifting attention to emerging markets in Africa,
Yaya and Shittu (2010) examined the impact of inflation
and exchange rate on conditional stock market volatility
in Nigeria. Using a QGARCH model, the study shows
that previous exchange rates and inflation rates have sig-
nificant effects on conditional stock market volatility. In
the same vein, Olweny and Omondi (2011) examine the
impact of macroeconomic indicators on stock market vol-
atility in Kenya using data from January 2001 to
December 2010. Applying EGARCH and TGARCH
models, their study reveals that volatility in Kenya is
largely influenced by interest rate, inflation rate and
exchange rate. Elsewhere, Hsing (2011) explores the
impact of macroeconomic factors on the stock price
behaviour in South Africa. With the use of exponential
GARCH model, Hsing (2011) finds that the growth rate
of real GDP, the ratio of money supply to GDP and the
U.S. stock market index have a positive impact on
South African stock returns, whereas government deficit
to GDP, domestic real interest rate, nominal effective
exchange rate, U.S. government bond yield and domestic
inflation rate have a negative impact on stock returns.
With regard to emerging markets in Asia, Patel (2012)
explores the influence of macroeconomic variables on
Indian stock market returns between January 1991 and
December 2011. Adopting Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM), Patel (2012) shows that all macroeconomic vari-
ables adopted in the study are major determinants of
stock price behaviour in India. Similarly, Zakaria and
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Shamsuddin (2012) provide empirical evidence on the
impact of macroeconomic volatility on stock market vola-
tility in Malaysia. Using GARCH model and VAR
Granger causality to estimate volatilities of inflation,
exchange rate, GDP, interest rates and money supply
between January 2000 and June 2012, their study finds
that all macroeconomic variables (except inflation) pro-
vide insignificant evidence of causality on the Malaysian
stock market. Most recently, Ahmadi (2016) evaluates the
effects of two macroeconomic variables, namely, output
growth and inflation, on real stock returns and volatility
of the Tehran Stock Exchange. Using EGARCH model,
the study breaks the sample period (2005–2014) into sub-
samples, thus accounting for major crises in the Iranian
economy. Ahmadi (2016) demonstrates that both output
growth and real stock returns largely determine stock
volatility in Iran during the sub-periods. However, no sig-
nificant evidence of effect was found when the whole
period was considered.
2.2 | Sentiment-Based determinants of
stock returns
The appropriateness (or otherwise) of macroeconomic
fundamentals in explaining stock price behaviour is
tainted by the plethora of recent behavioural finance
studies providing convincing evidence and empirical
alternatives. The behavioural strand of research focuses
on market sentiments and has enjoyed, on the one hand,
large support from the psychological evidence of cogni-
tive illusions in decision making and, on the other hand,
a myriad of empirical evidences. Sentiments, or in broad
terms, behavioural finance, suggest that investors react to
expected price development in the market by engaging in
complex cognitive assessment of fundamental, technical
and non-fundamental factors peculiar to the market. An
assessment of these factors, to a large extent, influences
investors' choice of stock (or portfolio) and has the poten-
tial to alter the stance of classical market theories
(Shefrin and Statman, 2000). However, although many
studies in the literature have documented both linear
(Edmans et al., 2007; Akansu et al., 2017) and non-linear
relationships (Bollen et al., 2011; Essaddam and
Karagianis, 2014; Chu et al., 2016; Salhin et al., 2016;
Bekiros et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2017) between stock mar-
ket behaviour and sentiments, the controversy still lin-
gers due to multifarious and imperfect proxies for market
sentiments.4
Furthermore, an array of theories has been proposed
in the financial literature to substantiate sentiments and
stock price return. For instance, Tinbergen (1939) prop-
ounded the adaptive expectation theory, Simon (1955)
proposed the bounded-rational theory, Tversky and Kah-
neman (1981) advocated the prospect theory, Mer-
ton (1987) introduced the investor recognition
hypothesis, Epstein (1999) explored the ambiguity aver-
sion theory, and Shefrin and Statman (2000) proposed
the behavioural portfolio theory. The underpinning argu-
ment of these theories is that stock prices are not solely
affected by fundamental indices. Rather, the activities of
noise traders also provide justification for human senti-
ments that drive market fluctuations. Accordingly, a
growing number of studies have adopted different proxies
to measure sentiments; these proxies are categorized as
market-based, media-based, internet-based, non-
fundamental and survey-based sentiment measures.
2.2.1 | Market-Based sentiment
measures
A variety of financial market-based proxies have been
used to establish a link between investors' sentiments
and stock market behaviour. Using trade volume, while
some studies in developed markets report a positive rela-
tionship with market returns, other studies in emerging
markets have documented a negative relationship
between trading volume and market returns. For exam-
ple, Gervais et al. (2001)'s study on the U.S. market, and
also similar studies in different countries (Chordia
et al., 2001; Gagnon and Karolyi, 2009; Chandra Pati and
Rajib, 2010; Chen, 2012), all find a significant positive
relationship between trading volume and return. Con-
versely, other studies, such as Lee and Rui (2000, 2002);
Bohl and Henke (2003); Girard and Biswas (2007);
Chiang et al. (2010), document a negative relationship
between trading volume and market returns.
Additionally, a few studies also adopt extreme 1-day
return to measure market-based sentiment. For instance,
Cox and Peterson (1994), Larson and Madura (2003) and
Barber and Odean (2007), all found a significant influ-
ence of extreme day return on price behaviour. Further-
more, a strand of research has focused on predictability
of price behaviour using the â€~investors fear gauge' as
measured by both the Credit Suisse Fear Barometer
(CSFB) and the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatil-
ity Index (CBOE VIX). In their respective findings,
Brown and Cliff (2004); Baker and Wurgler (2007);
Smales (2014); Freybote and Seagraves (2017) and Camp-
bell et al. (2018) among others, suggest that these two
measures are appropriate proxies for investors' sentiment.
Similarly, Ben-Rephael et al. (2012) investigate investors'
sentiment using mutual funds flow and reveal its signifi-
cant correlation with stock returns. Baker and
Stein (2004) adopt market liquidity as a proxy for
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sentiment by examining and reporting significant impact
of bid and ask spread on aggregate market returns. Kang
et al. (2002), Cooper et al. (2004), Bandopadhyaya and
Jones (2006), Antoniou et al. (2013) and a host of other
studies explain investors' sentiment and stock market
returns using price momentum. Furthermore, Lee
et al. (1991), Chen et al. (1993), Chopra et al. (1993),
Lowry (2003) and Doukas and Milonas (2004) demon-
strate that discounts (or premium) on closed-end funds
are as a useful factor in measuring the correlation
between stock returns and investor sentiment. In the
same vein, Baker and Wurgler (2004), Simões
Vieira (2011) and Feldman (2010) find dividend premium
as an adequate proxy of investor sentiment. They find
that investors express sentiment towards average book-
to-market ratio of companies paying dividends and also
to those not paying. Furthermore, using IPO as a proxy
for investor sentiment, Lee et al. (1991), Cornelli
et al. (2006), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Dorn (2009),
Finter et al. (2012) and Jiang and Li (2013), among
others, find first day returns and the volume of IPO to be
a significant barometer for investor sentiment.
2.2.2 | Media-Based sentiment measures
In another stream of research, protagonists of market
sentiments propose the tracking and extraction of inves-
tors' moods from social media networks and print mate-
rials (such as blogs, Facebook, Twitter, magazines, news
networks and other relevant finance-related media
sources). A significant number of studies report that
threads on social media can reflect, on the one hand, the
attitude of investors towards the market and, on the other
hand, investors' perceptions towards the general state of
the economy. Using twitter, Oliveira et al. (2013) indicate
in their study that the sentiment of stock-tweets has the
potential to predict stock market liquidity although with
little predictive power on return predictability. Providing
a robust explanation of the impact of tweet sentiments,
Rao and Srivastava (2012) analysed more than four mil-
lion tweets in a bid to examine the relationship between
the sentiments of board tweet and financial market reac-
tions. Employing the Granger causality test, the study
constructed a special mood tracking measure to differen-
tiate positive from negative tweets, and concluded that a
strong positive correlation exists between board tweets
and stock price behaviour. Other studies (Bollen
et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Rao and Srivastava, 2012;
Mostafa, 2013; Nofer and Hinz, 2015; Ranco et al., 2015;
Zhang et al., 2017) also find varying degrees of significant
relationship between twitter posts and stock price
behaviour.
From another perspective, O'Connor (2013) investi-
gates the correlation between Facebook posts and the
stock price behaviour of companies. Using a sample of
the 30 most popular consumer brands in the U.S., the
study identifies a high correlation between socio-
behavioural indicators of brands and their price perfor-
mances in the market. Likewise, constructing a Facebook
Gross National Happiness (GNH) measure, Siganos
et al. (2014) findings corroborate the findings of the
above study on Facebook sentiments by reporting a posi-
tive contemporaneous relationship between investor sen-
timents and stock returns.
In another vein, assessing the impact of articles in
magazines and popular financial newspapers (such as
Financial times, New York Times or Wall Street Journal)
on stock price movement, Barber and Odean (2007),
Dougal et al. (2012) and Ahern and Sosyura (2015) estab-
lish a varying significant effect of information published
in these financial outlets on stock returns. Similarly,
Uhl (2014) examined the propensity of sentiments from
more than 3.6 million Reuters' news articles to predict
returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Average stock index.
Using a vector auto-regression model, Uhl (2014) showed
that negative sentiments derived from Reuters provide
better explanation to stock returns than macroeconomic
factors.
To conclude, the importance of the above media-
related sentiments cannot be under-estimated given the
empirical weight espoused in these findings. However,
the arduous task involved in the mining of such types of
data, as well as the special analytical processes required
in the transformation and interpretation, make the use of
media-based data less feasible.
2.2.3 | Internet-Based sentiment
measures
Akin to media-related sentiments is the use of online sea-
rch facilities to gather relevant information about stocks
and their behaviour over time. In particular, to consider
the popular use of Investopedia, Google and Yahoo
(Finance) search engines to generate facts about stocks,
sector or aggregate market. Some studies have demon-
strated the pertinence of results generated from such
online searches on the attitudes of investors towards
returns, volatility and trading volume. For instance, using
a sample of 189 “Google-searched” stocks between 2008
and 2011, Takeda and Wakao (2014) found a positive
relationship among trading volume, stock returns and
Google online searches in the Japanese market. Their
results suggest that increased search activity is strongly
correlated with increased volume, but that the impact on
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stock returns is significantly weak. In another study,
Bordino et al. (2014) examined the relationship between
stock trading and web browsing using messages posted
on the Yahoo (Finance) message board. Using more than
2,600 stocks, their study reveals that web browsing on the
Yahoo (Finance) has predictive power on overall stock
trading volumes, although this is at a decreasing rate
when the stocks are grouped into industries or sectors.
Providing a different view however, Kim and Kim (2014)
used over 32 million messages posted on the Yahoo
(Finance) message board regarding 92 firms, extracted
between 2005 and 2010, and found no evidence of pre-
dictability of trading volume, volatility and stock returns,
whether at firm or aggregate level. However, their study
finds significant evidence that stock price performance
positively affects investor sentiments. Other related stud-
ies (Sehgal and Song, 2007; Drake et al., 2012; Preis
et al., 2013; Da et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2017) also affirm
the impact of Google and Yahoo online searches on trad-
ing patterns and stock behaviour.
2.2.4 | Non-Fundamental sentiment
measures
Interestingly, the literature has witnessed an array of
studies documenting the role of non-fundamental, or per-
haps, non-economic events, on market behaviour.
Authors of such studies argue that events such as avia-
tion disasters, sports competitions, health outbreaks, poli-
tics and weather, influence investors' risk disposition
towards investment decisions. For instance, documenting
the influence of sports on returns, Edmans et al. (2007)
report a significant correlation between match outcomes
and market returns. Using a cross-section of 39 countries,
their findings show that stock markets of match losing
countries suffer abnormal decline (of about −0.50%) a
day after a major international match is lost and such
decline is suffered particularly by small-stock companies.
Their study, however, finds no evidence of correlation
between stock returns and match victories. Corroborating
the findings of Edmans et al. (2007), Scholtens and
Peenstra (2009) find significant and positive next-day
returns for match victories and stronger negative returns
for match defeats. Meanwhile, from a firm-level point of
view, Chang et al. (2012) also find a significant next-day
decline in stocks of firms that are geographically located
near a losing National Football League team. In fact, they
reveal that the magnitude of decline in such stocks'
returns is significantly influenced by an unexpected loss
in important games.
Providing evidence for a weather-effect, Hirshleifer
and Shumway (2003) deploy a sample of 26 countries to
investigate the relationship between morning sunshine
and market returns, from 1982 to 1997. As humorous as
it may first appear, the authors in their wisdom neverthe-
less provide an intuitive revelation on how stock returns
are significantly correlated with morning sunshine, but
uncorrelated with snow and rain. Hence, the study cre-
ates a weather-based trading strategy for both itinerant
and agriculture-inclined traders, desirous of low transac-
tion costs and optimum gains. Supporting this argument,
Goetzmann et al. (2014) also detail significant correlation
between the weather-induced mood of investors and
stock returns. From a gender-based sentiment perspec-
tive, Wolfers (2006) explored the influence of CEO gender
on stock returns over the period 1992–2004. Using a sam-
ple of 1,500 firms, Wolfers (2006) reports no systematic
differences in returns of stocks, whether headed by a
male or a female. Chen (2007) assessed the effect of both
fundamental and sentiment indices on stock returns in
China. To proxy sentiments, the study adopted events
such as the United States 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Syd-
ney 2000 Olympics, the Asian financial crisis and the
SARS outbreak. The outcome of Chen (2007) study shows
that the sentiment indices have a significant negative
effect on stock returns in China.
The evidence of an air pollution-effect on stock
returns is also demonstrated in the work by Levy and
Yagil (2011). Drawing on data from four stock exchanges
in the U.S. and the Air Quality Index, their study demon-
strates that stock returns are significantly negatively
impacted by air pollution, particularly for those firms
located near to the pollution area. The finding of the
study thus provides a trading strategy for environmental-
conscious investors and firms, particularly industrial and
manufacturing firms that emit waste substances into the
ecosystem.
From the above studies, it is clear that the use of non-
fundamental factors as proxy for sentiments is well docu-
mented in literature. Caution is, however, necessary for
their adoption as non-fundamental factors are often soli-
tary events, with no direct connection to stocks; thus,
proposing an empirical relationship between such factors
and stock returns may require a leap of faith from the
readers or audience.
2.2.5 | Survey-Based sentiment measure
In lieu of the inconsistent sundry measures for market
sentiments, some studies generate sentiment indicators
through surveys, either by directly administering ques-
tionnaires to relevant respondents or by extracting survey
responses from existing databases. While some survey
questions are open-ended, others restrict respondents to
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pre-designed responses (i.e., close-ended). Regardless of
the restrictions they impose on respondents, close-ended
surveys have enjoyed widespread adoption in studies. A
popular instrument of survey-based sentiment measure is
the consumer confidence-sentiment index, computed by
the University of Michigan. This index largely addresses
investors' optimism on future expectations of the econ-
omy, and also highlights issues pertaining to the respon-
dents' financial and socio-economic conditions (Brown
and Cliff, 2005). Despite considerable usage of this index,
however, its susceptibility to dishonest and sparse infor-
mation inhibits its predictive power regarding market
behaviour, thus leading to conflicting outcomes in the lit-
erature (Singer, 2002; Schmeling, 2009).
While some authors report a significant positive rela-
tionship between market returns and investors sentiment
(measured by consumer confidence index), others have
outlined a significant negative relationship. For example,
David and Sultan (1998) investigated the link between
consumer confidence and financial market response
between 1980 and 1993. Their assessment of the effect of
consumer confidence on the conditional mean and vola-
tility of stock, bond and foreign exchange prices shows
that consumer confidence has a significant asymmetric
impact on the conditional mean of all sampled countries,
but not on their conditional volatilities. Using data for
11 European countries between 1986 and 2001, Jansen
and Nahuis (2003) investigated the short run link
between consumer confidence and stock market develop-
ments. With the aid of Granger causality, the study
observes a positive causal relationship between changes
in sentiments and stock returns of nine countries except
for Germany. In other work, adopting a Markov-
switching approach, Chen (2011) examined the relation-
ship between stock returns and confidence level of
consumers during fluctuations in the U.S. market.
Chen (2011) also finds that a positive relationship exists
between confidence level and stock market returns, such
that when there is decreased confidence, markets move
into a bear territory. Elsewhere, using vector auto-
regression to analyse weekly survey data in Germany,
Lux (2011) observes that a causal relationship between
investors' mood and subsequent stock price changes can
only be established when the time frame is taken into
consideration; that is short, medium or long run. In a
similar study in Germany, Finter et al. (2012) use a prin-
cipal component analysis to develop investor sentiment
indicators to examine whether these indicators explain
stock market returns in Germany. Their study records
that the indicators explain the return spread between
sentiment-sensitive and non-sentiment-sensitive stocks.
Furthermore, their study observes that sentiment has lit-
tle predictive power on expected returns in Germany.
Similarly, Chung et al. (2012) also examine the impact of
asymmetric sentiments on cross-sectional stock returns
with different regimes. Using business cycles from the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to segre-
gate economic states, and through adopting a multivari-
ate Markov regime-switching model, their study reveals
that investor sentiment is often related to expansionary
regimes, which in turn lead to high stock returns. How-
ever, their study details only an insignificant predictive
power of sentiment on stock returns during a state of
recession. In other work, Corredor et al. (2013) explore
the relationship between stock returns and investor senti-
ment in European markets. Their study finds that future
stock returns are positively affected by investor senti-
ment, although with varying significant levels across the
sampled countries.
As noted above, other studies have also delineated a
negative relationship between consumer confidence and
stock returns. Fisher and Statman (2000) suggest a statis-
tically significant negative relationship between changes
in investor sentiment and subsequent stock returns. Their
work reveals that low consumer confidence is followed
by positive high returns in the market. Also, Lemmon
and Portniaguina (2006) examine the relationship
between consumer confidence and small-stock premiums
in the U.S. Using data spanning the period 1956 to 2002,
their study reports that sentiment does not predict
changes in small-stock premium and momentum. In
other work, Schmeling (2009) explored the link between
investor sentiments and expected stock returns in
18 countries. Schmeling (2009) reveals a negative impact
of sentiments on stock market returns across the sampled
countries. Employing a cross-sectional approach,
Schmeling (2009) provides evidence to show that future
expected returns are low when sentiment is high, and
vice versa. In the South African market, Dalika (2014)
investigated the relationship between investor sentiment
and stock returns by constructing proxies for investor
sentiment for the period 1999 to 2009. Dalika (2014)
results show that investor sentiment has a significant
negative relationship with stock market returns for
South Africa; such that returns are high when sentiment
is low.
In a more recent study, Salhin et al. (2016) explored
the link among managerial confidence, investor confi-
dence and stock returns in the UK between 1985 and
2014. Their study finds that consumer confidence does
not affect stock returns in the UK, while managerial sen-
timent has a significant impact on both sector and aggre-
gate returns.
Other related studies have also documented consumer
confidence from different viewpoints, apart from stock
return. For example, Arabian and Zomorrodian (2007)
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explore the link between consumer confidence and eco-
nomic fluctuations using quarterly data from the
U.S. between 1980 and 2005. Although their Granger cau-
sality result shows that consumer confidence indices do
not Granger-cause GDP and vice versa, the forecast vari-
ance decomposition, however, reveals a significant pre-
diction of GDP by the variables adopted. In addition,
Zouaoui et al. (2011) investigated the power of consumer
confidence indicators to predict financial crises using a
panel of 16 international stock markets. Their study out-
lines two major findings: first, investor sentiment has
more impact on stock market returns in countries that
have a low market integrity and institutional involve-
ment. Secondly, their study also discloses that investor
sentiment has the potential to create stock market crises.
Finally, Ferrer et al. (2016) examined the relationship
between consumer confidence indices and stock market
meltdowns, using the dotcom and recent global financial
crises. Their findings suggest that it is not always the case
that consumer confidence will be positively related to
expected stock market returns.
From the above review, it is evident that previous
studies have adopted several proxies for sentiment and
the resulting outcomes have been varied. In this present
study, we contribute to the literature in two novel ways.
First, we introduce new alternative variables (ratio of lag-
gards to leaders and growth opportunity index) to capture
sentiments, and secondly, we estimate the impact of
these variables on returns from both linear and nonlinear
approaches, using sector-based data.
3 | MODELS AND METHODOLOGY
The analysis in this study is based on both linear and
non-linear regression models. The functional form of the
linear regression is expressed as follows:
Rit = α+
Xm
n= i
βnY t−n + ϵit
" #
ð1Þ
Where Rit is sectoral return index at different time
periods, m is the maximal lag, Yt symbolizes a vector of
explanatory variables at different time periods and ϵt is
the error or disturbance term. Following McMil-
lan (2001), for each of the regressors, we begin with a
lag length of five and systematically, we eliminate the
lags as they become statistically significant based on the
information criteria, hence eventually retaining their
contemporaneous form.
Furthermore, we employ a threshold regression
model in explaining sectoral returns using as threshold
variables, separately, the ratio of laggards to leaders and
the growth opportunity rate. Both threshold variables are
denoted as q1 and q2 respectively in model 2 below.
Regarding the origins of our approach, Tong (1978) and
Tong and Lim (1980) introduced the threshold regression
model as a form of time series model capturing the effect
of changes in behavioural patterns of explanatory vari-
ables on the predicted variable. Hansen (1999) later
developed this model to account for non-dynamism in
model specification. The threshold regression model is a
nonlinear model, which addresses the inherent flaws
associated with the use of a linear regression model.
Thus, the model considers both asymmetric effects and
also possible shifts in relationships, the latter being pecu-
liar features of business and economic variables. In a
threshold regression model, predictors are associated
with the outcome in a threshold-dependent way. The
inclusion of a threshold parameter (the change point)
allows threshold models to estimate nonlinear relation-
ships between the dependent and independent variables,
with almost complete accuracy. However, before
adopting the threshold model, we deemed it necessary to
ascertain the presence of linearity or nonlinearity in the
data by using a graph to depict the relationship between
the sectoral return and the two sentiment variables. This
is in line with prior studies such as McMillan (2001) and
Huang et al. (2008). The threshold regression models
have the following functional forms:
Rit = β0 + β1Yt I q1,2≥ν1,2ð Þð Þ+ ϵit½  ð2Þ
Alternatively, Equation 2 can be written as
R j =
β0 + β1Yt + ϵit , q1,2≥ν1,2
β0 + β1Yt + ϵit , q1,2< ν1,2
 
ð3Þ
We replace Equation 3 as follows:
Rtν 1,2ð Þ=
Y t I q1,2≥ν1,2ð Þð Þ
..
.
Y t I q1,2< ν1,2ð Þð Þ
0
BB@
1
CCA ð4Þ
By including the other non-threshold variables to
Equation 4, we have:
Rit = β0 + β1Yt ν1,2ð Þ+
Xm
n= i
βnY t−n
 !
+ ϵit
" #
ð5Þ
Equations 2–5 describe the relationship between the
dependent variable and its explanatory variables,
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distributed by the values of threshold variables (q1 and
q2) and given that the threshold variables are either
larger or smaller than the threshold values (v1 and v2).
In the separate equations, it is assumed that the thresh-
old value is unknown, hence when q1 or q2 is greater
than the threshold value v1 or v2, the resulting outcome
suggests a significant impact of the shift in behaviour of
the threshold variable. Furthermore, for efficient estima-
tion of β1 and β2, the equation requires that elements of
q1 and q2 are time variant and the error term ϵt is
assumed to have a mean of zero and finite variance, thus
independent and identically distributed.
4 | DATA
This study examines at industry level the relationship
between sentiment-apt investors and stock returns in the
UK. Data on returns covers aggregate monthly returns
for each of the sectors from the period January 1988 to
December 2017 and were sourced based on the
Datastream Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).
The UK market, according to the classification, is
grouped into 10 sectors with the following number of
firms: Oil and Gas (13); Basic Materials (25); Industrials
(105); Consumer Goods (43); Healthcare (18); Consumer
Services (86); Telecoms (6); Utilities (8); Financials (306);
and Technology (16). The sentiment variables used in the
study are (i) the ratio of laggards to leaders and (ii) the
growth opportunity index while other independent vari-
ables include the dividend yield, the price to book ratio,
the price to earnings ratio, the size and liquidity, for each
of the sectors. Our independent variables follow the
approach of Baker and Wurgler (2007) and in conjunc-
tion with the sentiment variables, they are calculated
from data obtained from Datastream. Table 1 shows the
definition of variables used in our study.
5 | EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
5.1 | Descriptive statistics & empirical
results
The empirical analysis begins with the descriptive statis-
tics. Table 2 includes the statistics of both dependent and
independent variables. As can be seen from Table 2, the
average of returns for the oil and gas sector (4.42) is the
highest among all the sectors while that of the utilities
sector (3.13) is the lowest within the same sample period.
This implies that investors in the oil and gas sector have
earned more average returns in the market than investors
in other sectors of the market. Bearing in mind the highly
volatile state of prices of oil in the international market,
it is not surprising to observe that investors in the sector
would earn a premium over other sectors' returns. Fur-
thermore, in terms of the growth opportunity index
(GRO), the oil and gas sector also has the highest average
growth opportunity (9%) of all the sectors, while the
financial sector reports the lowest (0.003). Based on our
computation of GRO, the figure suggests that within the
sample period, the oil and gas sector invested hugely in
capital projects compared to other sectors. This is clearly
tenable given the capital intensive nature of the oil and
gas sector. The fact that the financial sector has the low-
est growth opportunity index underscores the peculiarity
of the sector. Loans and advances are the major produc-
tive assets of the financial sector and do not form part of
their capital expenditure in the financial statement, as
used in our computation. At the same time, the financial
sector has the highest ratio of laggards to leaders (3.09)
within the sample period. This implies that on average,
in comparison with stocks appreciation, the financial sec-
tor witnessed the depreciation of more stocks in a current
month relative to the previous month. To a large extent,
this result is, perhaps, a reflection of the impact of the
TABLE 1 Definitions of variables
Variable Definition Measurement
Rt Monthly returns index
of each sector
Returnst = (Pt − Pt − 1)/Pt
− 1
GRO Growth opportunity
index
Total capital expenditure
divided by total assets in
the sector
LagLead Ratio of laggards to
leaders
Total number of stocks
advancing divided by
number of stocks
declining in prices
DY Dividend yield Dividend expressed as a
percentage of share price
at the end of each month,
for each sector
PBR Price to book ratio Market value of total listed
stocks of each sector
divided by their book
value
PER Price to earnings ratio Market value of total listed
stocks of each sector
divided by their book
value
SIZ Size Natural logarithm of total
assets of each sector
LIQ Liquidity Natural logarithm of total
volume of trade for each
sector
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TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: OIL AND GAS SECTOR
Rt 4.42 4.48 0.38 3.64 4.95 −0.51 1.95
GRO 0.09 0.09 0.02 2.32 7.81 0.06 2.12
LagLead 2.16 2.17 0.21 1.71 2.53 −0.13 1.79
DY 4.14 3.72 1.25 2.32 7.81 0.75 2.57
PBR 1.98 1.80 0.77 0.83 4.39 0.68 2.83
PER 13.42 13.82 4.04 5.93 29.03 0.71 4.09
SIZ 8.18 8.29 0.41 7.43 8.75 −0.55 2.09
LLIQ 6.09 6.18 0.38 5.28 6.79 −0.39 2.07
Panel B: BASIC MATERIALS
Rt 3.93 3.84 0.33 3.30 4.51 0.09 1.65
GRO 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.15 2.17
LagLead 2.53 2.54 0.13 2.18 2.89 −0.21 2.68
DY 3.74 3.93 1.05 0.93 7.47 −0.03 2.41
PBR 2.13 2.06 0.6 0.64 4.53 0.90 4.55
PER 12.38 12.18 3.06 4.49 4.53 0.44 3.51
SIZ 7.72 7.75 0.57 6.76 8.56 0.03 1.71
LLIQ 6.16 6.18 0.23 5.44 6.63 −0.66 3.30
Panel C: INDUSTRIALS
Rt 4.10 4.09 0.35 3.39 4.75 −0.02 2.09
GRO 0.05 0.04 1.03 1.97 6.51 0.41 2.32
LagLead 2.70 2.59 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.22 1.44
DY 3.40 3.18 1.03 1.97 6.51 0.93 3.16
PBR 2.50 2.51 0.79 0.97 4.33 −0.06 2.29
PER 13.38 13.76 2.63 7.27 19.85 −0.46 2.50
SIZ 7.82 7.85 0.35 7.04 8.38 −0.12 1.71
LLIQ 6.20 6.26 0.32 5.50 6.90 −0.14 2.22
Panel D: CONSUMER GOODS
Rt 3.64 3.61 0.40 2.93 4.41 0.16 2.11
GRO 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.06 1.64 4.91
LagLead 2.08 1.90 0.40 1.43 2.69 0.24 1.37
DY 3.84 3.39 1.34 1.36 8.70 1.12 4.24
PBR 3.47 3.44 1.01 1.49 7.79 0.82 4.78
PER 13.21 12.98 2.29 7.80 18.21 0.07 2.74
SIZ 7.98 7.97 0.23 7.43 8.41 −0.38 2.63
LLIQ 5.51 5.31 0.59 4.51 6.57 0.26 1.57
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kutosis
Panel E: HEALTHCARE
Rt 4.40 4.51 0.36 3.63 5.03 −0.42 2.36
GRO 0.05 0.05 0.02 2.17 5.22 0.13 1.78
LagLead 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.09 −0.31 2.22
DY 3.61 3.70 0.67 2.17 5.22 −0.17 2.19
PBR 6.15 5.79 2.02 3.51 12.81 1.32 4.40
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
PER 16.26 15.36 5.69 7.98 35.55 1.16 3.76
SIZ 7.21 7.58 0.79 5.79 8.28 −0.60 1.93
LLIQ 5.98 5.96 0.32 5.34 6.71 0.28 2.05
Panel F: CONSUMER SERVICES
Rt 4.07 4.12 0.27 3.47 4.52 −0.44 2.47
GRO 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.87 2.91
LagLead 2.96 2.95 0.13 2.59 3.29 0.17 2.76
DY 3.08 2.87 0.64 2.10 5.24 0.95 3.31
PBR 2.35 2.39 0.47 1.31 3.46 0.01 2.13
PER 14 14.14 2.18 9.80 18.77 0.01 2.18
SIZ 7.96 8.03 0.41 7.11 8.53 −0.31 1.74
LLIQ 6.56 6.58 0.36 5.76 7.23 −0.29 2.29
Panel G: TELECOMS
Rt 3.59 3.60 0.32 2.88 4.09 −0.28 2.16
GRO 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.73 7.20 0.57 1.84
LagLead 1.79 1.86 0.23 1.11 2.24 −0.74 2.73
DY 3.78 4.11 1.44 0.73 7.20 −0.51 2.49
PBR −0.97 3.63 27.3 −268.58 10.51 −6.71 53.50
PER 16.13 13.12 1.91 7.69 53.94 1.92 6.55
SIZ 7.86 8.13 0.43 7.20 8.37 −0.36 1.24
LLIQ 6.22 6.31 0.63 4.86 7.26 −0.24 1.84
Panel H: UTILITIES
Rt 3.13 3.06 0.39 2.31 3.72 −0.25 1.96
GRO 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.04 7.40 1.38 3.87
LagLead 2.03 2.05 0.14 1.67 2.34 −0.19 2.26
DY 4.95 4.95 0.81 3.03 7.40 0.28 3.07
PBR 2.41 2.59 0.96 0.56 4.58 −0.39 2.19
PER 11.56 12.26 3.28 2.64 17.47 −0.66 2.59
SIZ 7.59 7.75 0.46 6.66 8.15 −0.56 1.95
LLIQ 5.92 5.94 0.30 4.88 6.46 −0.69 3.61
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kutosis
Panel I: FINANCIAL
Rt 4.23 4.38 0.35 3.42 4.63 −0.94 2.50
GRO 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.01 2.44 10.54
LagLead 3.09 3.13 0.22 2.57 3.48 −0.35 1.92
DY 3.97 3.68 1.15 2.45 12.00 1.88 10.09
PBR 1.31 1.25 0.38 0.46 2.28 0.21 2.36
PER 12.22 11.85 2.51 6.69 20.40 0.60 3.33
SIZ 9.28 9.34 0.53 8.32 9.91 −0.34 1.74
LLIQ 6.56 6.78 0.51 5.31 7.27 −0.71 2.32
Panel J: TECHNOLOGY
Rt 3.95 3.90 0.40 3.20 4.83 −0.01 2.17
GRO 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.54 1.51
LagLead 2.25 2.32 0.28 1.43 2.87 −0.62 2.95
(Continues)
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2007 global financial crisis on financial sectors across the
world. Also included in the descriptive statistics are the
results of skewness and kurtosis normality tests. The out-
puts show that many of the variables deviate from nor-
mal distribution.
Table 3 shows the results of the pairwise correlation
matrix. Across all sectors, the variables are reported to
have a statistically significant relationship with each
other, except in a few cases. Furthermore, while some
sectors report reasonably low coefficients among the
independent variables, other sectors reveal a high corre-
lation among the independent variables. Of particular
concern is the correlation coefficient between the two
sentiment variables (ratio of laggards to leaders and
growth),where the correlation coefficient is also high.
This might pose a multi-colinearity problem, and to avoid
this, in our threshold regression estimates, both variables
are isolated as separate threshold variables rather than
estimating them concurrently.
Given the non-stationarity nature of most time series
data, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-
Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin
(KPSS) stationarity tests were conducted to ensure that
variables used for this study are devoid of unit root. In
principle, the ADF and PP statistics for all variables
should be negative, whereas the KPSS should be positive;
hence, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected
if the computed t (tau) statistic (for ADF and PP) is more
negative than the critical value at any particular point in
time. The ADF tests are based on a maximum of 16 lags
differences as determined by the Akaike Information Cri-
terion (AIC), while the Newey-West procedure is used to
calculate bandwidths for the PP and KPSS tests. In addi-
tion, Bertlett's Kernel is used for spectral estimation. The
output of the unit root test (as shown in Table 4) suggests
stationarity of variables at level and/or first difference.
Table 5 shows the empirical findings of the OLS
regression. Following McMillan (2001), for each of the
regressors, we begin with a lag length of five, and system-
atically eliminate the lags as they become statistically sig-
nificant based on the information criteria, hence
eventually retaining their contemporaneous form.
Table 5 reports the linear regression results for all sectors.
For the first sentiment variable (ratio of laggards to
leaders), we propose that an increase in this variable will
lead to a decrease in the overall sectoral return. In view
of this proposition, using the linear regression estimate,
three sectors significantly conform to our hypothesis,
while others have a significant positive relationship. The
three sectors that significantly conform are basic mate-
rials(−0.04*), healthcare(−0.20***) and utilities(−0.11***)
sectors.5 Their negatively signed coefficients suggest that
an increase in the proportion of laggards to leading stocks
results in a decrease in the overall return of those sectors.
In the case of the second sentiment variable (growth
opportunity index), we hypothesize that an increase in
this variable will propel an increase in overall sectoral
returns. The result of the growth opportunity index has a
significant impact on the overall return indices of indus-
trials (3.11***), consumer goods (11.88***), utilities
(0.96***), financials (4.65**) and technology (6.69***) sec-
tors, although it has no significant impact on overall
returns in four sectors (oil & gas, healthcare, consumer
services and telecoms). Furthermore, despite the signifi-
cant impact of the sentiment variable in the basic mate-
rial sector, its negatively signed coefficient (−0.81***)
does not conform with our hypothesis. In our opinion, its
nonconformity is, perhaps, due to the sensitivity of the
sector to business cycles, such as fluctuations in purchas-
ing power. Most firms in this sector rely heavily on a
vibrant economy, and their activities often involve extrac-
tion and supply of raw materials for construction pur-
poses. Other independent variables, such as dividend
yield, PB ratio, PE ratio and size and liquidity, also reveal
a significant impact on sectoral returns at different levels
of significance. Our results conform with the earlier posi-
tion of similar findings on investor sentiment such as
Baker and Wurgler (2007); Huang et al. (2008); Bekiros
et al. (2016) and Yang et al. (2017).
Our preliminary regression suggests that across the
sectors, a mixture of significant positive and negative
relationships exist between the dependent variable and
the sentiment variables. Shifting attention to a non-linear
estimation, we employ a threshold regression model to
TABLE 2 (Continued)
DY 1.32 1.31 0.19 0.25 3.03 0.18 3.16
PBR 5.05 3.94 3.63 1.34 22.40 2.05 7.48
PER 18.35 16.44 9.32 8.89 81.08 3.91 21.77
SIZ 6.25 6.49 0.54 5.24 7.30 −0.53 1.84
LLIQ 5.4 5.68 0.95 0.00 6.65 −1.58 6.82
Note: This table shows the descriptive statistics of variables adopted in the study and data covers the period from January 1988 to December
2017.
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TABLE 3 Correlation matrix of variables
Variable Rt GRO LagLead DY PBR PER SIZ LLIQ
Panel A: OIL AND GAS SECTOR
Rt 1.00
GRO −0.63*** 1.00
LagLead 0.83*** −0.42*** 1.00
DY −0.23*** 0.29*** −0.16*** 1.00
PBR −0.09* 0.01 −0.20*** −0.69*** 1.00
PER −0.22*** 0.07 −0.47*** −0.13*** 0.60*** 1.00
SIZ 0.97*** −0.67*** 0.81*** −0.18*** −0.16*** −0.25*** 1.00
LLIQ 0.76*** −0.62*** 0.70*** −0.44*** 0.24*** 0.20 0.74*** 1.00
Panel B: BASIC MATERIALS
Rt 1.00
GRO 0.64*** 1.00
LagLead −0.54*** −0.26*** 1.00
DY −0.84*** −0.56*** 0.50*** 1.00
PBR 0.15*** 0.24*** −0.18*** −0.40*** 1.00
PER −0.10* −0.20*** 0.10** 0.14**** −0.07 1.00
SIZ 0.93*** 0.61*** −0.45*** −0.65*** −0.14*** −0.03 1.00
LLIQ 0.59*** 0.44*** −0.21*** −0.43*** 0.08 0.27*** 0.66*** 1.00
Panel C: INDUSTRIALS
Rt 1.00
GRO −0.82*** 1.00
LagLead 0.80*** −0.67*** 1.00
DY −0.79*** 0.61*** −0.64*** 1.00
PBR 0.66*** −0.53*** 0.41*** −0.72*** 1.00
PER 0.46*** −0.26*** 0.11** −0.56*** 0.57*** 1.00
SIZ 0.94*** −0.87*** 0.81*** −0.61*** 0.55*** 0.23*** 1.00
LLIQ 0.68*** −0.62*** 0.59*** −0.46*** 0.59*** 0.20*** 0.77*** 1.00
Panel D: CONSUMER GOODS
Rt 1.00
GRO −0.72*** 1.00
LagLead 0.83*** −0.54*** 1.00
DY −0.70*** 0.56*** −0.50*** 1.00
PBR 0.61*** −0.54*** 0.40*** −0.56*** 1.00
PER 0.75*** −0.59*** 0.57*** −0.58*** 0.78*** 1.00
SIZ 0.94*** −0.86*** 0.78*** −0.59*** 0.59*** 0.73*** 1.00
LLIQ 0.85*** −0.68*** 0.93*** −0.56*** 0.43*** 0.57*** 0.82*** 1.00
Panel E: HEALTHCARE
Rt 1.00
GRO −0.76*** 1.00
LagLead −0.45*** 0.74*** 1.00
DY −0.15*** −0.33*** −0.54*** 1.00
PBR −0.04 0.48*** 0.58*** −0.72*** 1.00
PER 0.01 0.54*** 0.63*** −0.79*** 0.76*** 1.00
(Continues)
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
SIZ 0.95*** −0.77*** −0.44*** −0.06 −0.04 −0.13*** 1.00
LLIQ −0.08 0.40*** 0.78*** −0.66*** 0.62*** 0.55*** −0.01 1.00
Panel F: CONSUMER SERVICES
Rt 1.00
GRO −0.93*** 1.00
LagLead 0.32*** −0.32*** 1.00
DY −0.71*** 0.59*** −0.42*** 1.00
PBR 0.34*** −0.15*** 0.12** −0.64*** 1.00
PER 0.32*** −0.17*** 0.41*** −0.73*** 0.81*** 1.00
SIZ 0.92*** −0.94*** 0.30*** −0.47*** −0.03 0.03 1.00
LLIQ 0.65*** −0.72*** 0.69*** −0.53*** −0.01 0.32*** 0.72*** 1.00
Panel G: TELECOMS
Rt 1.00
GRO −0.64*** 1.00
LagLead 0.74*** −0.74*** 1.00
DY −0.08 0.04 −0.31*** 1.00
PBR −0.01 0.13*** −0.15*** 0.28*** 1.00
PER 0.52*** −0.13*** 0.44*** −0.69*** −0.30*** 1.00
SIZ 0.69*** −0.95*** 0.78*** −0.04 -0.15*** 0.15*** 1.00
LLIQ 0.60*** −0.86*** 0.84*** −0.31*** −0.17*** 0.28*** 0.88*** 1.00
Panel H: UTILITIES
Rt 1.00
GRO −0.79*** 1.00
LagLead −0.44*** 0.15*** 1.00
DY −0.44*** 0.37*** −0.21*** 1.00
PBR 0.78*** −0.79*** −0.08 −0.63*** 1.00
PER 0.79*** −0.72*** 0.00 −0.67*** 0.74*** 1.00
SIZ 0.97*** −0.86*** −0.38*** −0.39*** 0.84*** 0.77*** 1.00
LLIQ 0.36*** −0.61*** 0.47*** −0.58*** 0.68*** 0.58*** 0.47*** 1.00
Panel I: FINANCIALS
Rt 1.00
GRO −0.68*** 1.00
LagLead 0.80*** −0.59*** 1.00
DY −0.55*** 0.36*** −0.27*** 1.00
PBR 0.23*** 0.03 −0.24*** −0.32*** 1.00
PER 0.13*** −0.17*** −0.17*** −0.41*** 0.58*** 1.00
SIZ 0.90*** −0.72*** 0.91*** −0.38*** −0.19*** −0.13*** 1.00
LLIQ 0.92*** −0.70*** 0.87*** −0.33*** −0.03*** −0.05 0.95 1.00
Panel J: TECHNOLOGY
Rt 1.00
GRO −0.42*** 1.00
LagLead 0.61*** −0.58*** 1.00
DY −0.34*** −0.35*** −0.26*** 1.00
PBR 0.09 0.69*** −0.27*** −0.51*** 1.00
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
PER 0.57*** 0.16*** 0.37*** −0.55*** 0.28*** 1.00
SIZ 0.66*** −0.94*** 0.69*** 0.23*** −0.55*** 0.03*** 1.00
LLIQ 0.54*** −0.70*** 0.86*** −0.03 −0.36*** 0.23*** 0.79*** 1.00
TABLE 4 Unit root test of variables
Level Differenced
Variable ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
Panel A: OIL AND GAS SECTOR
Rt −1.53 −1.61 2.24 −20.99 −21.25 0.16
GRO −2.40 −2.45 1.04 −18.83 −18.83 0.03
LagLead −2.01 −3.99 1.98 −16.97 −64.70 0.27
DY −2.17 −2.16 0.42 −16.14 −21.28 0.22
PBR −2.13 −1.74 0.71 −15.55 −20.19 0.23
PER −2.36 −2.31 0.56 −20.01 −20.12 0.09
Size −1.29 −1.29 2.21 −19.00 −19.00 0.09
LLIQ −1.87 −2.49 1.41 −20.18 −43.88 0.23
Panel B: BASIC MATERIALS
Rt −1.31 −1.38 2.21 −17.12 −17.12 0.04
GRO −1.90 −1.92 1.22 −18.91 −18.91 0.13
LagLead −3.20 −9.85 1.03 −16.72 −56.74 0.06
DY −2.23 −2.35 1.42 −17.04 −16.96 0.03
PBR −3.26 −3.25 0.29 −19.79 −20.10 0.07
PER −3.36 −3.78 0.17 −17.92 −17.93 0.02
SIZ −0.85 −0.89 2.34 −19.77 −20.13 0.10
LLIQ −3.0376 −3.82 1.43 −6.19 −56.99 0.14
Panel C: INDUSTRIALS
Rt −0.99 −0.99 2.19 −16.99 −16.91 0.05
GRO −0.94 −0.98 1.90 −18.58 −18.58 0.07
LagLead −1.38 −2.37 1.81 −15.97 −42.84 0.13
DY −2.43 −2.37 1.23 −16.89 −16.85 0.03
PBR −2.63 −2.41 1.02 −21.20 −21.21 0.11
PER −2.63 −2.71 0.32 −17.55 −17.53 0.06
SIZ −1.95 −2.06 2.36 −19.80 −19.84 0.27
LLIQ −1.63 −2.23 1.63 −6.70 −46.02 0.09
Panel D: CONSUMER GOODS
Rt −2.84 −2.70 1.08 −17.07 −16.99 0.03
GRO −1.93 −1.94 1.50 −18.88 −18.88 0.04
LagLead −1.37 −1.62 1.94 −18.98 −40.31 0.13
DY −2.84 −2.70 1.08 −17.07 −16.99 0.03
PBR −2.81 −2.88 0.96 −15.65 −18.32 0.08
PER −2.88 −2.85 1.17 −15.69 −20.04 0.04
SIZ −1.05 −1.05 2.10 −19.16 −19.16 0.07
LLIQ −1.40 −1.41 2.01 −19.28 −30.10 0.06
(Continues)
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Panel E: HEALTHCARE
Rt −1.53 −1.61 2.24 −20.99 −21.25 0.16
GRO −0.76 −0.76 1.91 −18.91 −18.91 0.14
LagLead −1.91 −3.64 1.27 −16.31 −50.92 0.12
DY −2.87 −2.48 0.29 −16.21 −21.72 0.07
PBR −1.86 −1.99 0.46 −21.72 −21.75 0.11
PER −1.85 −1.72 0.43 −20.90 −20.97 0.11
SIZ −1.23 −1.23 2.19 −19.18 −19.19 0.09
LLIQ −1.32 −1.99 0.60 −5.05 −34.68 0.13
Panel F: CONSUMER SERVICES
Rt −1.59 −1.59 2.03 −17.81 −17.78 0.12
GRO −1.47 −1.47 2.07 −17.94 −17.92 0.10
LagLead −2.63 −7.81 0.59 −17.62 −66.60 0.11
DY −2.77 −2.98 0.72 −18.13 −18.12 0.03
PBR −2.19 −2.18 0.19 −20.14 −20.14 0.06
PER −2.78 −2.78 0.27 −20.12 −20.12 0.04
Size −3.22 −3.56 2.34 −17.36 −17.31 1.00
LLIQ −2.19 −1.62 1.31 −5.49 −43.21 0.20
Panel G: TELECOMS
Rt −1.82 −1.81 1.78 −18.28 −18.32 0.14
GRO −1.56 −1.56 1.66 −18.92 −18.92 0.07
LagLead −2.88 −3.59 1.42 −23.01 −55.11 0.15
DY −1.38 −1.38 0.52 −18.89 −18.89 0.21
PBR −4.56 −5.88 0.12 −18.68 −26.01 0.04
PER −3.14 −1.92 0.22 −6.93 −20.58 0.10
Size −1.41 −1.41 1.86 −18.97 −18.97 0.13
LLIQ −1.46 −1.43 1.35 −17.53 −36.71 0.21
Panel H: UTILITIES
Rt −2.12 −1.94 2.13 −22.54 −22.35 0.25
GRO −1.47 −1.47 1.47 −18.14 −18.14 0.08
LagLead −2.03 −7.21 1.09 −17.49 −70.84 0.27
DY −2.97 −2.91 0.46 −21.12 −21.05 0.10
PBR −1.96 −1.89 1.44 −21.77 −22.14 0.35
PER −2.53 −2.52 1.24 −20.25 −20.28 0.22
Size −2.82 −3.13 2.10 −4.11 −19.72 0.77
LLIQ −2.91 −3.87 0.63 −17.31 −45.59 0.40
Panel I: FINANCIALS
Rt −2.17 −2.14 1.87 −18.15 −18.17 0.27
(Continues)
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explore further the empirical threshold-dependence of
sectoral returns on the sentiment variables (ratio of lag-
gards to leaders and growth opportunity index). In the
models, both sentiment variables represent the threshold
variables and are estimated separately as q1 and q2
respectively. Based on our hypothesis, the coefficient of
q1 is expected to be significantly negatively signed,
whereas q2 is expected to produce a significant
positive sign.
Although the threshold value is unknown, nonethe-
less, using the posterior mean,6 we hypothesize, first, that
in a prescribed sector of the stock market, if the ratio of
underperforming to over-performing stocks is increasing
(i.e., ratio of laggards to leaders), sentiment-disposed
investors would avoid such sectors and by implication,
the overall return index of the sector would be negatively
affected. This is given the fact that sentiment-prone
investors are mostly risk-averse investors who are gener-
ally more concerned about loss minimization rather than
return maximization. We also hypothesize, secondly, that
investors' attitude towards each sector of the stock mar-
ket is divergent. However, sector(s) with higher growth
opportunities are not only attractive but also coveted by
rational investors, thus resulting in the attitudes of
investors towards some particular sectors converging.
Hence, such sectors exert an influence on investors' psy-
chology and in turn, create a significant impact on the
overall sectoral return index.
Table 6 shows the first threshold regression results
for all sectors. The threshold variable in this model is
the ratio of laggards to leaders, while other indepen-
dent variables constitute the non-threshold variables.
Based on the output, the coefficients of the threshold
variable for the six sectors conform with our hypothe-
sis. This suggests that any increase above the threshold
value will trigger a significant negative impact on the
returns of the six sectors. Starting with the oil and gas
sector, its result shows that for any increase in the ratio
of laggards to leaders above the estimated threshold
value of 2.23, the return of the sector will fall by
−0.23**(0.11),7 this being the coefficient of the thresh-
old variable. For the industrial sector, its negatively
signed coefficient of −0.25***(0.03) shows that an
increase above its estimated threshold value of 2.97
will result in a one-quarter decline in aggregate stock
returns of the sector. Furthermore, the consumer goods
sector shows an estimated threshold value of 2.37.
Hence, an increase above this value will result in a loss
of −0.46***(0.07) of the sector's aggregate returns, this
being the coefficient of its threshold variable. Again,
the consumer services sector reports a threshold value
of 2.98. With a threshold coefficient of −0.48***(0.04),
this result shows that almost half of the sector's return
would be a loss, should there be an increase above the
threshold value. The utilities sector shows that an
increase above the threshold value of 2.13 will result in
a decline in the sector's return by about −0.06*(0.04)
and lastly, the result from the financial sector shows
that its estimated threshold value is 3.32. An increase
above this figure will cause a drop in the sector's return
by −0.08**(0.04).
From the above findings, it is evident that financial
sector has the highest threshold value (3.32) among the
six conforming sectors. This figure further corroborates
our initial descriptive statistics that report the financial
sector to have the highest mean ratio of laggards to
leaders (3.09). By implication, for the six conforming
sectors,8 we postulate that when the proportion of lag-
ging to leading stocks increases above the threshold
point, investors in those sectors would embark on
profit-taking, hence the aggregate returns for the sectors
will fall. Apart from the threshold variable, other non-
threshold variables in the model, such as the dividend
yield, the PB ratio, the PE ratio and the size and liquid-
ity also reveal significant impact on sectoral returns at
different levels of significance. Our results are similar to
those of Bandopadhyaya and Jones (2006); Baker and
TABLE 4 (Continued)
GRO −3.86 −3.60 1.33 −15.62 −15.97 0.28
LagLead −1.46 −4.24 2.25 −15.65 −81.08 0.18
DY −3.78 −4.05 0.50 −6.73 −25.12 0.02
PBR −2.61 −2.58 0.64 −19.37 −19.39 0.08
PER −3.23 −3.35 0.28 −18.16 −18.15 0.04
Size −2.02 −1.97 2.31 −4.20 −20.21 0.46
LLIQ −2.93 −1.83 2.08 −6.29 −44.86 0.31
Panel J: TECHNOLOGY
Rt −1.18 −1.19 1.26 −15.05 −15.43 0.11
GRO −0.77 −0.79 1.98 −18.45 −18.44 0.10
LagLead −1.86 −2.85 1.28 −16.88 −44.98 0.22
DY −2.68 −2.76 0.41 −17.92 −17.90 0.04
PBR −2.22 −2.60 0.62 −22.32 −22.31 0.07
PER −3.13 −2.88 0.21 −16.54 −16.58 0.03
Size −0.28 −0.28 2.23 −16.97 −16.97 0.09
LLIQ −4.00 −1.56 1.43 −25.99 −42.37 0.31
Note: This table shows the unit root test for all variables in each sec-
tor. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are based on a maxi-
mum of 16 lags differences as determined by the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) while the Newey-West procedure is
used to calculate bandwidths for Phillips-Peron (PP) and
Kwiatkwoski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. Also, Bertlett's
kernel is used for spectral estimation. Data covers the period from
January 1988 to December 2017.
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Wurgler (2007); Bekiros et al. (2016) and Yang
et al. (2017).
With regards to the results of the second sentiment
variable9 (growth opportunity index), the coefficients of
the threshold variable for six sectors also conform with
our hypothesis. Based on the output of the industrial sec-
tor, the coefficient of the threshold variable is 6.24***
(0.97) while its threshold value is 0.03. By implication,
any increase in the growth opportunity index above 0.03
will result in an increase in the sector's aggregate return
by 6.24. For the healthcare sector, its threshold value of
0.05 suggests that any increase above this value will stim-
ulate an increase in return by 6.86***(1.33). Furthermore,
the consumer services sector has a threshold value of
0.08 with a threshold coefficient of 1.20***(0.54). This
implies that a marginal increase of returns in the sector
will be recorded when growth rises above the threshold
point. For the telecoms sector, this also has a threshold
value of 0.08 but has a higher threshold coefficient of
5.37***(0.97); the utilities sector has a threshold value of
0.06 with a threshold coefficient of 1.42***(0.47) and the
technology sector has a threshold value of 0.06 with a
coefficient of 1.12***(0.26). Other sectors that do not con-
form with our hypothesis but have a significant negative
coefficient are: the oil and gas (−11.34**)(0.11),10 the
basic materials (−2.23***)(0.09), the consumer goods
(−22.75***)(0.03) and the financial sectors (−7.62***)
(0.004). Again, in conformity with our earlier descriptive
statistics, the oil and gas and the financial sectors have
the highest and lowest threshold value, respectively. This
is in spite of their negatively signed coefficient. We posit
that the negatively signed coefficient of these sectors
demonstrates the apathy of investors towards excessive
growth. This is, perhaps, because firms with a growth
potential systematically retain part of their yearly profits
for future capital expenditure. This corporate action may
not be endured by some investors, particularly those who
are dividend-oriented. Other non-threshold variables in
the model, such as the dividend yield, the PB ratio, the
PE ratio and the size and liquidity also reveal significant
impact on sectoral returns at different levels of
significance.
5.2 | Robustness checks
As a robustness test, we separate the whole sample
periods into pre, during and post-global financial crisis
(GFC) of 2007/2008. Consequently, we re-estimate the
predictability of sentiment variables on sectoral returns
for each of these sub-samples. Table 7 presents the results
for the period of the GFC, Table 8 shows the results for
the period of pre-GFC and Table 9 presents the results
for the post-GFC. Generally, in the sub-sample periods,
we observe that the two sentiment variables have a signif-
icant influence in many of the sectors, particularly during
the financial crisis sub-sample period, although the coef-
ficient of some of the variables report opposite signs
when compared with the full sample period. Therefore,
we interpret our results for these tables in a similar fash-
ion as for the earlier obtained results. A graphical repre-
sentation of variables for the sub-sample periods is
shown in Figures 3–5.
We observe that during the sub-sample periods, senti-
ments relating to healthcare, utilities and technology sec-
tors do not have the predictive power to explain returns
in those sectors compared to the full sample period. How-
ever, results for the oil and gas sector and the financial
sector become more significant for the GFC sample sub-
period than for the other periods. We infer from these
results that investors in both sectors reacted strongly to
the sub-prime crisis which ravaged several stock markets
in the world. Based on our findings, we submit that our
results are consistent with previous studies, and acknowl-
edge that the predictive ability of sentiments on asset
returns is suitably measured and understood using non-
linear models, as have been used in previous studies
(e.g., McMillan, 2001; Chu et al., 2016; Salhin
et al., 2016).
6 | CONCLUSION
Previous studies into investor sentiment have focused
mostly on aggregate market returns with an emphasis on
predefined sentiment variables. To complement such
research, this study makes important contributions to
existing literature in two ways. First, we examined the
role of sentiment-apt investors in influencing the overall
return index of all sectors in the UK market from 1988 to
2017. Secondly, we established the importance of two sec-
toral level factors in predicting the returns of the sectors
from both linear and nonlinear regression approaches.
For the first sentiment variable (ratio of laggards to lead-
ing stocks), the study highlights the importance of the
threshold value such that for any given sector, in a partic-
ular month when there is an increase in the proportion
of laggards to leading stocks above the threshold value,
investors in the sector would gradually embark on sell-
offs, which in turn affect the returns of the sector. For the
second sentiment variable (growth opportunity index),
the study observes that any increase above the growth
threshold value means that the return for the sector will
also increase. Other non-threshold variables in the
models, such as the dividend yield, the PB ratio, the PE
ratio, and the size and liquidity also show a significant
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FIGURE 3 GFC sentiment indicators and sector groupings returns [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE 4 Pre-GFC sentiment indicators and sector groupings returns [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE 5 Post-GFC sentiment indicators and sector groupings returns [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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impact on sectoral returns at different levels of
significance.
The policy implications of our study are important.
Given the developed state of the UK market, the find-
ings that sentiment-disposed investors play significant
roles in sectoral returns is highly noteworthy. A well-
developed market such as the UK stock market is pre-
sumed to be almost close to being an efficient market;
and thus the activities of a certain class of investors
should have little or no significant impact on the
return characteristic of any sector. This is due to the
informational efficiency of such a developed market.
However, in accordance with the results obtained, we
posit that the UK stock market is mostly composed of
risk-averse investors who are generally concerned
more about risk or loss minimization rather than
return maximization.
For future research, we suggest that other studies
may build on this study to examine other areas not
highlighted. For instance, they may address the role of
sentiment-induced investors across markets rather than
on a single market as in our case. Also, other studies may
expand the sample period to account for other financial
crises apart from the 2007/2008 GFC, as used in the pre-
sent study.
ENDNOTES
1 EMH is built on certain assumptions that have either been partly
amended or nullified by some of the recent empirical studies in
behavioural finance.
2 The graphs presented in Figures 1 and 2 are further used to assess
linearity of the variables in the methodology section.
3 Garcia and Liu (1999) classified both Japan and United States as
industrial economies while Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Taiwan and Thailand were classified as developing
economies.
4 See introductory part of this paper for some of the controversies
surrounding the proxies.
5 Figures in parenthesis represent the coefficient values of the lin-
ear regression estimate while *, ** and *** represent 10%, 5% & 1%
significant levels respectively.
6 The posterior mean is done by allowing the iteration process to
allocate additional probability, in order to smoothen out the maxi-
mum likelihood estimate of the threshold values.
7 Figures in parenthesis represent the standard error while *, ** and
*** represent 10%, 5% & 1% significant levels respectively.
8 Due to page constraint, we only interpret the results of the six
sectors conforming with our hypothesis. However, results of
other four non-conforming sectors (basic materials,
healthcare, telecoms and technology) are reported in the
threshold regression table. These sectors, in contrast to our
hypothesis, report a threshold coefficient that is significantly
positively signed.
9 The results of the second threshold variable (growth opportunity
index) are also reported in Table 6.
10 Figures in the first parenthesis represent coefficient of threshold
variable, figures in the second parenthesis represent threshold
value while *, ** and *** represent 10%, 5% & 1% significant
levels respectively.
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